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BOOK REVIEWS
REVUE TEES LIVRES

Canadian Criminal Evidence . 13y P. K. 1VICWILLIAMS. Agincourt :
Canada Law Book Ltd. 1974 . 1?p. civ, 703 . ($40 .00)
The Law of Evidence in Civil Cases. By JOHN SOPINKA and
SIDNEY 10Ï. LEDERMAN. Toronto: 13utterworths. 1974. Pp . xxi,
637. ($50 .00)
Although their styles differ markedly, in some ways Canadian
Criminal Evidence and The Law of Evidence in Civil Cases
complement one another and both will undoubtedly find a place
in the libraries of Canadian legal practitioners. Canadian legal
writers, with ;a few notable exceptions, have simply been compilers of cases and marshallers of precedent. McWilliams' Canadian Criminal Evidence follows closely this tradition, and can
aptly be described as resembling a collection of obscurely related
quotations and headnotes arranged vertically. No new insights into
the ideologies or social forces that lead to the development of the
rules are revealed ; no new theories or rationales for particular
evidentiary concepts are put forward ; no critical analysis of
existing doctrine is undertaken ; no new developments or directions
in Canadian evidence law are suggested; indeed, seldom is . a
principled or even a factual reconciliation of conflicting case
authorities attempted. McWilliams makes no claims that his book
was written to achieve any of these purposes . In the preface he
states that the book was written to assist the Bench and Bar by
providing a convenient reference to and digest of cases on
criminal evidence . The book will undoubtedly be of value to
those practitioners who are interested in. the question "Is there a
case on point?" or the more sophisticated "How many?", and
who for one reason or another are unable or too lazy to search
the digest for evidence cases. It will not be condemned by prac,
tising lawyers as academic.
VdcWilliams collects cases under approximately 1,100
headings and sub-headings, arranged, in terms of the policies that
underlie the rules of evidence, in no apparent order. Indeed the
book looks very much like an energetic lawyer's note book to which
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new materials are added simply by creating a new heading or
sub-sub-heading. No attempt is made to integrate the materials
into a systematic whole. While this method of organizing the
materials makes evidence law appear as a rag-bag containing a
multifarious collection of unrelated rules, it will permit a lawyer
with an admissibility problem to use a word descriptive of the
matter in dispute, for instance, tape recording, certificate, previous
conviction, or documents found in possession of the accused, and
quickly find some cases dealing with the same matter. The
arrangement should be extremely useful to a lawyer who does not
know for sure whether he has a problem relating to hearsay,
authentication, best evidence, relevancy, opinion testimony,
privilege or character evidence . As a repository of references to
Canadian criminal cases, Canadian Criminal Evidence is likely
very nearly definitive, and apparently it was not intended to be
anything more than that.
The purpose of the Sopinka and Lederman book on the law
of evidence in civil cases is not as modest . The authors assert in
their preface that they hope their book "will shed at least some
faint ray of light on the subject" . Thus presumably they were
not content to produce another mere digest of evidence cases .
They intended to reconcile and to integrate cases, to state the
relation of particular decisions to other holdings upon the point,
and to uncover unifying principles in the clutter of decisions on
Canadian civil evidence law. In short, one can assume from the
preface that they undertook the task of presenting this area of
the law as a comprehensible whole. Given the paucity of critical
writing on Canadian evidence law upon which the authors had to
build,' their efforts must be adjudged to be, in large part, a
success.
The chapters on hearsay, best evidence and privilege are all
developed in a similar manner and are particularly well done.
The chapter on hearsay, for instance, begins with a short discus
sion of the history and rationale of the hearsay rule . A definition
of hearsay is proposed and the authors suggest an analysis for
viewing hearsay problems which is based on the difficulties of
weighing testimonial proof that the rule was intended to minimize .
The authors then undertake a careful analysis of each exception
'Indeed the excellent materials prepared by Professor Stanley Schiff
of the University of Toronto, entitled Evidence in the Litigation Process,
and as yet, unfortunately, unpublished, was the only current Canadian
material before this text which treated Canadian evidence law as a unified
body of knowledge.
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to the hearsay rule that is applicable to civil cases. The discussion
of each exception begins with a brief statement of the exception,
followed by an analysis, which usually takes into account the
results of modern theory,_ of the reasons given for the exception.
The factors that must be present before a declaration qualifies
within e particular exception -are then individually reviewed and
the cases reconciled. Where Canada has borrowed legislation from
the United States, notably with respect to the admissibility of
business records, the leading American cases are cited and
explained . It is a treat to see well-reasoned American cases woven
into the text, rather than a line-up of the same tired old English
cases. Indeed since Canadian common law rules of evidence
are almost identical to the American rules, it is unfortunate that
American cases are not cited even more frequently . However,
perhaps their absence can be explained as being a concession to
the profession which at times does not seem to realize that the
United States is a common law jurisdiction,z that some of the
greatest judges in the common law world have graced its Benches,
and that modern . English evidentiary jurisprudence, and consequently Canadian jurisprudence, is largely founded upon United
States jurisprudence. Indeed, it is °rather unfortunately founded
on American jurisprudence as it was one hundred years ago,
before the brilliant analysis of Thayer, Wigmore, Morgan and
others had its effect on the case law .3 Finally, the authors critically
evaluate the hearsay exceptions in terms of the principles presently
underlying the rule. Thus not only is case reconciliation undertaken, but also the more challenging task of systematization .
2 McWillians, in the preface to his book, states that he did not "hesitate
to draw upon many excellent decisions in recent years coming from England
and other common law jurisdictions". However, he cites only a handful
of American decisions, and then the citation usually follows a quotation
from Wigmore, or some other authority, where the author cites the cases
cited by that authority.
3 The most influential English evidence treatise in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century was Taylor on Evidence, the last and 12th
edition of which was published in 1931. Taylor in the preface to his first
edition stated, "The following work is founded on `Dr. Greenleaf's American
Treatise on the Law of Evidence"' . Indeed so closely did it follow the form
and substance of Greenleaf that Thayer felt it should have been called
"Taylor's Greenleaf" . Thayer, Bedingfield's Case-Declarations as a Part
of the Res Gestae, in Legal Essays (1908), p. 207, at p. 210, n. 1 . The
subsequent editions of Taylor wholly ignored American developments
brought about by the writtings of Thayer, Wigmore and others . Consequently, until only very recently English jurisprudence was being premised,
in large part, upon an analysis of evidentiary principles developed by an
American from American cases decided before 1842.
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Undoubtedly, future judicial developments in this area of the law
will be influenced by the authors' analysis.
Unfortunately, this high standard of legal analysis is not
maintained throughout the book. In places this work too degenerates into a citation of cases strung together under arbitrary
headings. Practitioners might find these parts of the book a useful
mine out of which to dig cases, but they will, not be of much
assistance to them in attempting to understand the rules, their
inter-relationships, or in constructing creative arguments out of
the chaos created by the case authorities . For instance, under the
major heading Relevancy are found such disparate subheadings
as Collateral Facts, Opinion and Previous Proceedings, none of
which have anything more to do with relevancy than any other
doctrine of evidence law. Under The Use of Character Evidence
to Prove a Fact in Issue, the authors discuss five ways of
impeaching the credibility of witnesses. In a chapter called Documents, the principles of evidence that apply to documents are
often obscured and confused. Indeed much of the discussion found
earlier when the authors are dealing with the hearsay exceptions
and the best evidence rule is repeated in a different form in this
chapter. Since authentication is the only principle of evidence
law that relates to documents and that had not yet been discussed
in the book, one might have expected the authors to confine the
chapter to this problem.
Given the time and energy that must have gone into producing these books, they undoubtedly deserve a more detailed
appraisal than I have thus far given them . However, the urge to
make any further remarks about the authors' interpretation of
the cases, or the content and organization of their books, is far
overshadowed by a sense of despondency evoked by the fact that
the books had to be written at all.
When will we be candid enough to admit that like many
other legal phenomena the law of evidence is dead? Provincial
courts, where over ninety per cent of criminal cases are tried, only
function as well as they do because trial judges, often more practical and sensible than their appellate court brothers, have in
large part ignored the rules. When -an eager counsel presses an
objection to exclude evidence most trial judges, again sensibly,
perhaps embarrassed by the charade, ignorant of the complications of the rules, or more likely curious about the evidence that
counsel is trying to keep out and conscious of their responsibility
to make a just determination of the case, admit the evidence
subject to the objection. While the drama of the .ritual involved
in invoking the rule of evidence may entertain the counsel, an
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impartial observer would be justified in questioning its practical
significance . 1 am reminded of a conversation with a provincial
Court judge, who by general consensus conducted one of the
better courts in the province, in which he remarked that he had
been doing justice for twenty years and was proud of the fact he
did not know one rule of evidence . The rules are apparently not
often applied in civil trials either . The authors of - The Law of
Evidence in Civil Cases justified limiting their book to civil trials
on the ground of the "discrimination of rule-application between
criminal and civil trials".4 Presumably they mean the rules are
applied even less frequently in civil trials .

In appellate courts the case authorities are so conflicting on
most points that they are largely self-cancelling. However, more
importantly, as anyone who reads the books under review with
an open mind must realize, the whole of what is called the law
of evidence is in fact little more than a word game played by
lawyers and judges who have become so entrapped into their own
jargon that they have forgotten the reasons for the rules and
the ultimate objectives of the system. Recourse to such word
mongering has too often been, as Mr . Justice Cardozo called
recourse to rules of thumb, "a lazy man's expedient for ridding
himself of the trouble of thinking and deciding".°
Sopinka and Lederman in places gallantly attempt to
rationalize the irrational . If their arguments are used by counsel
and move a court to adopt a less irrational position on some
point of evidence their book will have served a useful purpose.
oth of these books could serve a much more significant purpose
if, now that the conflicting cases, the artificial categories, and
the word games are all before us, they lead us to exhume and
perform a post-mortem on the corpse of the law of evidence, and
then to rebury it along with its ghost which now haunts us from
the grave.
Lawyers often apotheosize the rules of evidence by making
indefinite references to ubiquitous rules and cases that supposedly
embody the experience and wisdom of the ages ., Hopefully one
P. 3.
Cardozo, What Medicine Can 13o for the Law, in Law and Literature
and Other Essays (1931), p. 92 .
s McWilliams in his preface states that the rules have "great strengths"
and "have been proved over the .years to be the bulwarks of our liberty" .
He further states that "There is much of the law of evidence which should
most assuredly be preserved" . P. vi. 5opinka and Lederman, while frankly
recognizing the need for reform of the rules of evidence, assert that any
legislative- reforms "will have to incorporate many of the existing principles".
P. ix .
4
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day when one of these lawyers is frantically searching through his
Canadian Criminal Evidence to see if he can find a case on point
some wise and honest judge will lean over and exclaim: "who
cares!" He will then decide the fate of the offered proof by
making a simple judgment based on the few principles that
underlie any rational adjudicative process and that are often
obscured in these books beneath a myriad of cases .
NEIL BROOKs*

Assessment of Damages for Personal Injury and Death. By HAROLD

Sydney : Butterworth Pty Ltd. 1974 . Pp. xxxii, 350.
(No Price Given)

LUNTZ.

This is an outstanding book : it is certainly one of the best monograghs on any branch of the law of tort that has appeared in the
common law world in the last thirty years. This must have been
a particularly difficult book for the author to write for not only
is the subject he has chosen to write about an intrinsically complicated one but the author feels that the whole system of common
law damages should be jettisoned in favour of periodic benefits
paid on a no-fault basis. Indeed, one gets the impression that Mr.
Luntz would be very happy if there were no need for successive
editions of his book .
If there is an aspect of the law of damages which has not
been extensively and acutely discussed, I have not been able to
find it. Whether he is dealing with the rule in Brunsden v.
Humphrey,' the rule in B.T .C . v. Gourley, 2 the collateral source
rule, actuarial methods of computing damages and many other
topics, the author is always clear, exhaustive and forceful .

All this does not mean that I would agree with all of Mr.
Luntz's recommendations . Thus, in a "no-fault world", Mr. Luntz
would abolish the private action for damages for assault and
battery but the reasons he gives for this recommendation are not
convincing. He argues that punitive damages do not make sense
in a world of liability insurance . This is true, but presumably, in a
no-fault regime liability insurance will be a thing of the past.
Alternatively, even with liability insurance, there is no reason why
* Neil Brooks, of Osgoode Hall Law
Toronto .
1 (1884), 14 Q .B .D . 141 .
2 [1956] A .C . 185 .
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